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UNCERTAINTY AND (HE SIABILIIY OF IBE ARMAMENTS
*
it'D. L. BluTo ANt) M. I). INTRIIIGATOR
The paper inrestigaies the denwuics of on arniamenls race in a model of resource allocation. The pre-
ordering of weapons .spoce in the ullocatii'e model is constructed from ii .S!rategic d'nanue model etf a
nuclear war. The strategic model incorporates uncertainty in the effeclireness of weapons and lags In
their impact, it was shown that an equilibrium Ierel of armaments e'isls and the Cournot solution would
heshibleat this equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTiON
Models about armaments fall into two classes: simple analytical models that
derive from the Richardson tradition and very complex computer simulation
models. The first class of models cannot address many of the problems that are of
interest to policymakers: in particular they cannot address problems that involve
interaction of technology, strategy and crisis stability within the context of an
armaments race. The second class of models is very useful for simulating particu-
lar situations such as an encounter between a submarine and an ASW taskforce or
the problem of finding an optimal targeting pattern of the Minutemen force. These
models are very useful at the micro-level but are often very complex and adhoc.
This paper explores the interaction between technological and strategic
considerations in a potential nuclear war and the implied dynamics of an arma-
ments race. It extends the previous work of both authorsin the general area of
strategy and arms races [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. It presents ananalytical model of the
dynamics of a nuclear war which incorporates both time lags and uncertainty.In
particular, it investigates the effect of the dynamics ofa potential nuclear warthat
incorporates uncertainty on the stability of an armaments race.
2. INTERACTION BETWEEN WEAPONSCHoicEsAND STRATEGIC CHOICES
The interaction between weapons choices and strategicchoices is a funda-
mental element of the arms race. The strategic options open to a nationdepend, to a
great extent, on its weapons systems, while,conversely, the weapons systems a
nation procures depend largely on its strategic goals.The strategic concepts
adopted by the various armed services in the recent period, forexample, have been
choices based to a large extent on the weaponsavailable to the individual services.
Thus the Air Force during much of thisperiod advocated a counterforce strategy,
according to which prime targets should be enemymilitary installations, perhaps
because its bombers and land based missiles werewell suited to such targets. At
the same time the Navy advocated acountervalue strategy, according to which
prime targets should be enemy cities,perhaps because its submarine based missiles
were well suited to such targets[4].
* This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation(GS-36358)
and the Mershon Center at Ohio State University.
279I l3oth political and iiiiliiarviithorilics parti ipateinioices of Iit(l
choicesofstrategies.lypicallythe politicalauthorities decideOil theallocation
of resources to l)rOiveaponsv Ink theniilitarvauthorities decideoth
specific typesofweaponsprocured. As to strategic choices, the poltticalauthontes
ty 'ically bear responsibility for decisions regarding war initiation atidwar terinjna.
tionwhile themilitaryauthoritiesdecide on targets arid rates of lire inwartiflie
The two sets of choices--weapons and strategyand the two dccisjonmakers-
political and militarv---are represented in the basic model [4]. Themodel is based
onprevious work by Brito addressed principallytothe allocation ofresources to
procure weapons by the political authorities in the context of anarmament iace
arid on previous work by IntriligatoraddressedprincipalI' to the choice oftargets
and rates of fire in wartime by the military authorities.
3.RFViFW 01PRrVR)iJS WORK
Brito [2] studied the arms race in the context ofa model of resource allocation.
He considered a model with two cOtiiltr!es denoted by 1 arid 2and indexed by I orj.
Each of these countries was assumed to maximize
(I) e"UJC1. D1(M1, M1)]dtLi1,2: i
subject to the constraints
=- tiM1
and the j-th country's reactions. The function L'[C,.D(M A'!1)] is a twice diflerenti-
able strictly concave utility function, whereC is the consumption of the i-th
country, A! is the weapons stock of the i-thcountry and D(M, M) is the index
of defense, a technological andstrategic preordering of weaponspace. Z1 is the
net investment in weapons at timet,fiAI is the amount of resources consumedto
maintain a weapons stock ofsiz.e M,.andY1 is the net national product ofcountry i.
Using (I), (2) and (3), Brto deriveda dynamic model of an armament race and
showed that finite equilibriumlevels of armaments consistent with bothrnaximiza-
tions exist given appropriateassumptions about weapons technology. Itwas
assumed that both indices of defenseincrease Idecrease; at a decreasing(increasjng)
rate with one's own (enemy)weapons. These assumptions are sullicient toensure
that both objective functions(I )vill have a maximum, and hencethat an equili-
brium exists.
Thestability ofan equilibrium levelofarmanientsdepended oii more question-
able assumptions. If itwas assumed that the two countries behave ina myopic
manner, there was no questionthat the equilibrium is stable,as in the Richardson
equation model. If, however, itis assumed that thetwo countries behave in a more
sophisticated manner, forexample using information aboutcurrent armament levels and therate of change ofarmament levels to predict future levels of arma-
ments, which levels are usedto plan current investment inarms, then the stability of the equilibrium isin question.
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treats strategic choices made byboth countries [31. Assuming again that there are
two countries. I and 2 indexedby i or j: that there is only one weapon. referred to as
a "missile:' whereM1(r) is the number of missiles aailahle to countryiat time I
and there is an index of casualtiesin each country. where N1(i) is thenumber of
casualties in countryiat time t. the dynamic model issunimarized by the four
differential equations
(4) = --iMfI Li=1.2: i
(5 t=M(l - fl)r U=1.2: 1
Equation (4) shows the time rateof change (decrease) in the missilestocks of
country i as stemming from twoconsiderations. First, countryidecides to (Ire its
missiles at a certain rate, designated, which can rangebetween zero and some
inaxlmtlm rate, ,assumed given and tIuite. Second, countryiis losing missiles
as they are beingdestroyed by counterforce missilesof countryj.Of the missiles
fired byj,represented byM1. the fractionThare targeted at enemymissiles
(counterforce) where [i can rangebetween zero (pure countcrvalUc)and one (pure
counterforce). The missiles firedcounterforce by] destroy 1M of the i missiles.
wherefis the counterforce effectivenessratio, the number of i missilesdestroyed
by one counterforcemissile- Equation (5 showsthe time rate of change(increase)
in casualties incountryistemming from countervahiemissiles launched byj.
Thus, of the missiles fired. the fraction(1 -f)fired counter\altic inflict
I - casualties, where t'is the countervaluceffectiveness ratio, the
number of i casualtiesinflicted by one] countervalliemissile.
Equations (4) and (5). inwhich all variables arc timedependent. together with
the boundary conditionsstating that each countrystarts with a givenstock of
missiles and no casualties atthe outset of the war attime 0. determine theevolution
of the war over time.The payoff countryi is assumed todepend on values of
missiles and casualties atthe end of the war,T. and optimal strategies arcobtained
for i by maximizing thepayoff function. It isshown in [3] that theoptimal strategies
are switchingstrategies, with targetsswitching from purecounterforce to pure
countervalue and ratesswitching from the maxinlUillrate to the icro rate.
Since the maximizedvalue of the payofffunction depends on theinitial
conditions, an index of defensesimilar to theD(-)function above can he con-
structed. This functiondepends on initialtechnological and strategicconsidera-
tions. A more completedescription of this synthesis canbe found in [4].
4. Tiit: ENLARGED MODEL.
The enlarged modelofa nuclear war introducestwo additionalconsiderations
to the analysis.First, it incorporatesthe significant lag betweenthe time a missile is
launched and the timeit hits its target. As aconsequence of thislag, if the other
side detects thelaunch it has the optionof launching its missilesbefore they are
destroyed. Seconds it incorporates
uncertaintY. As the war progresseswith missiles
being launched byboth sides, unless theparties have perfectreconnaissance
capabilities, each sidedoes not know forcertain whether a givenmissile site is
empty. Clearly theprobability that a givenwarhead will destroy amissile declines
281as theproh.tbiiitvthat a given missile site is enlptv increases. i'heseelements can
hi'ticorpo rat ciiii a n cn I arced vi' rc jofl 0! the has ic model of a in issi Ica i
i. sing a notation sliehtivdillerentfrom (4) and (5. let 7(t) be thenumber of
missiles the t-th country tires at the j-th country's missiles at time(, jrj lttfi(t)
he the number of rriissiles thei-thcountry tires at the j-th country'scities, each
measured as missiles launched per unit time.' Let /, he the expectedvalue of the
number of the ithcountry'swarheads that will he destroyed byOflCofthej_th
country's warheads given that the missile site attacked is notempty. /is then the
product of the probability that a given attacking warhead destroysa missile site
and the number of warheads in the missile site. Letp, be the probability thata
given missile has been tired and letI.he the lag between the timea missile is
fired and the time it strikes the target. The equation that describesthe change in
in the missile war is then
=[it) + /1(1)] -- /[ I - '(t)](tL).
If we define ito he the expected number of casualties inflictedon the i-th country
by an attackiimg warhead then the equation that describes thechange in the i-th
countrys casualties N(t( is given b
N1U) = i-.fl1(t - L).
The only equations necessary to complete the systemare those for p1(r).
At this point it is useful to introduce three moreassumptions. First, assun
that at any point in time, i. the missiles tiredare froni sites that had not been
attacked as of t =I.and the missiles to he tired are selected froma uniform
distribution second, assu me neither side has perfectreconnaissance2 capabilities:
and third, assume that targeting isone missile site per targeted warhead. These
assumptions will be relaxed in fuit tire work.
Define .t) to be the number of warheads inthe i-th country's missiles sites
that have not hecu attacked at time: : define :( 1) to he the number of' warheads
that have been tired from unattackeditcs in the interval (0.. :(t)divided by the
number of warheadsin a missile site is then the number of empty unattacked
missile sites. The probability thatan unattacked site is empty is
= V(1)
Since itis assumed that missiles to he tiredare selected froma uniform
distribution, the probability thatat timer < t a missile from u'(t) will he selected is
.t(1) 1(r). The number of warheads thathave been fired from unattacked missile
sites can thus he approximated by
(9a) ;(t) = [(i) 4- fl(r)] th'. 0 T.
I)'( ,)
where 7° is definedas
(9 h y( ,.4. ;.)
=
Jo .,( i-)
Note thai a, and fi, arcnotthe same asihe aand /1,thaiappear in equations 4) and 5It will heassumed thaia,tr) -4- (cu) < k where k1isa constraint on the rate of lirc 2 Weare assuming that each side canmonlior the other sides rate of tire hutcannotdetermine the esaci source of aitackjnmissilesThe boundary conditions for (11) are
(ha) p.(0)=O
p(t)=I forT.
Equation (11) gives the change in theprobability that a missile site in countr) I
will be empty as a function of the current rateof fire of country i and its remaining
unattacked missile sites. The boundaryconditions state that at the outset of war
none of its missile sites are emptyand at and after the time when allunattacked
missiles have been fired the probability is one.
The number of remaining unattackedmissile sites, v,tt), it itself determined by
the rate of fire of the other country.
'(t) =-L),
i.e., the decrease in imattackedmissile sites is exactly the rate oftire against missiles.
with a lag of length L. Theboundary conditions for (12) areclearly
(12a) v1(0)=M1(0).
i.e., at the outset of war allmissile sites are unattacked.
Equations (6), (7), (11) and(12) summarize the dynamicsof a missile war.
Following the scenario describedin detail in (4). the militaryauthorities in each
country use these equations tochoose optimalcontingencystrategies. ihe alues
of these optimal contingencystrategies are then communicated tothe political
authorities.
The optimal contingency strategywill be worked out for one importantcase.
Consider the case in which countryI initiates the war: country2 reacts with a lag
L2 and country 1 assumesthat country 2 is choosingits strategy in a manner that
will minimize the value ofthe country 1 objectivefunction.3 The last assumption.
which is a zero-sumassumption. is not as objectionable asit might seem atfirst
glance since the discussioninvolves contingency strategies.which can be considered
a "worse case"analysis.
The military authority isgiven an objective functionby the politicalauthorities
of the form:
V1=,nW 1(T) +,nM2(T) + nN1(T) +,iN2(T)
where ni and nare the valuesassigned to M1(t) and N(T) bythe political authori-
ties. To compute thecontingency strategy themilitary authoritiesin the first
Note that lag L2 is a reactionlag, not the technical timeof (light lag introduced ,thoe
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that is, the lime when all unattacked
given unattacked missle site
missile
is empty is then
+;i







L(t) +I(t) 0< tT.
v1(t)country maximrte (13) su bjectto each countr%'s missile.casualty and proha hility equations (6), (7), (II) and (I2):initial conditions, and theConstraint
(14) x,(t) + JL,(r) = 0for () < I S1.2
The solution to hisprohem is I(M1(Oj. M,(0)). To solve thisproblem, letp he the costavariable associated with ;withp1A1withv1and/L,with N1. The Hamiltonian is given by:
(IS) H(N
=p12(1) + ; +i1(t(J
+j{(t)+ /1(t)]- .I2.1i'i(')]2u -
+ J1i2fl2(t-- L) +P22(t- 1.)
-,i2(tfl2(o)]
+': - {2(I + ±/7[
2(t)J
P2(I)]1(tL) +p,r1/i1(tL).
Since there areno lags in theta,evariables the costateequations are





Assume in thisexample that the solutionis in the interior.(If the solution were to be ona houndar3 the dualvariable associatedwith the nonnegalj'jt) constraint wouldappear in thetransvcrsalitCondition5) Thetransversalit) conditions are
(171 p1(T)0'1(T)
= 0'.,(T) =
J)2(T) = 0Pr17)= PI'
/2(1)= 0p2(T) =
2X4integrating the differential equations of the costate variables for the appropriate
















Let+ L = 0. the militaryauthority in country I will pick at eachpoint in time
(t) and1i1(t)in a manner that will maximize (see [7])
H(0) + flU).
Assume the military authoritiesin country 1 are operating underthe assump-
tion that the militaryauthorities in country 2 are choosing2(1)and112()in a
manner that mininuizes(19).Let(r)be the Lagrange multiplierconstraint associ-
ated with the constraint(t) + I3() = k1 andà2(t)be the multiplier associated
with the constraintcz2(t)+ I2(t) = k2. TheKuhnTucker conditions for the i-th
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The star (*) on the controlvariable designates an optimalsolution. From the KuhnTuckerconditions it follows that if(t) + /i(t) > 0 then thecontrol chosen and switchpoints depend on the sign of theswitching function
(22) -,n/1[1 - P2W)]- P2(0) -12tI0.
As long as(t) + f1(t)0, i=I, 2, (22) will not bean equality almost everywhere strategies will then becornersoltitionsWe can thus define{t}k =1. ,n, tin(0, T) as strategy switch points for the i-thcountry. That is to say the pointswhere the i-th country changes from counterforceto counterval tie or vice.versa.
Proposition 1
If country I at some timeemploys a counterforcestrategy and at another time employs a countervaluestrategy, then country 1 willinitially employa counter- force strategy, makinga single switch to countervaluestrategy, i.e., for country I, (t)> 0 for some t and fJ(t)> 0 for some (imply that(t)=k1 fortin [0, t1j and Jir(t)=for tin T -- U.
Proof. It is clear from thedefinition of p(t) that ifp(t1) > 0 for sonic
lin (0, T) then p(t)> Ofor all tin(ii,T). Second if(t)=0 for tin (2. 13) thenp() is non-decreasing in(2. 13). Finally P2 so pis non-decreasing Thecontrol chosen and switch pointsthus dependon the sign of (22). If ati= i the term in braces is larger thannv1 ,then c1(t)=k1,ifit is smaller then /i1(t)=k1 ,and ifit is equa!, then lisa switchpoint. Att=0 there are two interestingpossibilities: first, if the expression givenby (22) is negative,then the firstcountry will initially choosea countervajue strategy and sincethe term in braces isnon-increasing then fl1(t)=k for all tin (0, T- L), and second if(22) is positivethen the first Country willinitially choose a counterforcestrategy. Thereare then two possibiljtjsfirst, (22) will be positive for all tin (0,T - L) and(t)=k for all tin (0, T- L): second, (22) is zero for some tin (0, T- L) then fl1(t)=k for t in('i, 1). But since the term in braces is non-increasingin 1), 1=T L). Thisproves the proposition. Definet1as the time the i-thcountry ceases fire, that is(z) + /i(r)=0 for all I >
Proposition 2
If Country 2ceases firing beforecountryIhas switched tocountervalue then Country I willnot switch tocountervaluc until allcountry 2 missiles have
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1) and for the second countrybeentargeted, i.e., 12c < implies(t) =k1 for alltin M2(O}Ik ]where
M2(0)/k1 is the time at which all of thececond country's missile sites have been
attacked.
Proof.The change in the sign of inequality (22) depends onlyon P2(6) and
p2(8) where ),(0)=0 and 20 if202 =0. Thus if the inequality (22) is
positive at 2cthen the inequality will remain positive for all tin [t,,M,(0)/k1].
5.EXISTENCE AND STABILITY OFAN EQUILIBRIUM
This section gives sufficient conditions for the existence and stability ofan
equilibrium level of armaments in the enlarged model. With these conditions, if the
dynamic equations for the arms race are given by
Af1=F1(M1,M7)
M2=F2(M1,M2)
then there exists equilibrium levels of missile stocks, M andM,,such that
F2(M1,M2)=0
Letus approach the proof byfirstsolving a simpler problem.Letus suppose
that Mis fixed at
The current value Hamiltonian for maximizing (I) given (2) and (3) is given by
UI[C1,D(MI,MJ)] +q(Z1-fl1M1)+).1(Y1 - Z1 -C1).
The i-th country wants to pick Z. andC,in a manner that will maximize the
Hamiltonian for the q on the trajectory of a solution to the differential equation
D1
q.= - + [r + fl1]q,
(L'j
and the transversality conditions
urn e"q1(t)M1(t)=0.
Let q'(M1, M) be the set of prices that solve the optimization problem in the sense
given M=M, maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to q= q,(M,,M1) will
result in an optimal solution assuming this optimal solution exists.
If we use the KuhnTucker Theorem to maximize the Hamiltonian,wehave
as the saddlepoint conditions,
ci[_i]=o:
Z.[q1-2J=0.
C1 cannot be zero since the marginal utility would then be infinite. Therefore
a U.
=
287The strictly concavity of L11(-.) implies, using the Implicit Function Theorem, that
C,=C1(2, A11, it!1).




the differential equation for itis given by
=-C[q(M, - fl1M, if q1
and
= /JM if q1<L-
These equations can also be writtenas
=F1(M, M1)
Let M he the solution to(M1,Ai =0. It is clear that jfK!1>0 then !(M,)=





Combining these two equationsto eliminate the multiplierwe have







't)1(A11 Al.) -, --
('M1
urn <0 -,x -
-i2D(M., Al.)
l!m---_---__± >0 (Al(AIJ-
288Then there exists M such that a solution exists for the optimization and for
all M equations (36) and (37) can be solved such that M1= g(M)and
g(M)0.
Proof. A sufficient condition for a maximum to exist is that U[C,, D(M1, M,)]
is strictly concave: Given the assumptions about U() the only diffIculty can be





3C3D1tD iM iD ?M
and the only ambiguity in the sign of the second minor is introduced by the term
i2U i2D
D, ?Mr
By assumption there exists M' such that the ambiguity disappears since
can be made arbitrarily small or negative. The second part of the lemma
can be shown by differentiating equations (36) and (37) with respect to A1 and
solving for dM1/dM1 whereF,(Pv11,MJ)=0.
.D1 iD,?U?'D i'U,?D
-i2




iD 1M1± (' + IcC?D, ?M1
(2UD.
(r+
Given the assumptions about U1(C1, D.) andD(A1.M) the ambiguities in the sign
of dMJdM are caused by U1/D1 2DJi3M andLT1/D1 2D/1M1LM.. Again, by
assumption there exists an M" such that the ambiguity disappears. Let M.=
max [Mr, M*].
Lemma 2
M1=g(fvI3)<Y1/fl for all M.
Proof. The lemma follows from the assumption thatthe marginal utility of
zero consumption is infinite. Butif consumption is positive then Z1<Y1, implying
'i<
Proposition 3
If the preordering of weapon space for the politicalauthorities D.[M1(0), M340)]
is a positive linear combination of( ., .), defined above as the solution tomaxiiniz-
ing (13), treated as a function of theinitial missile stocks, then the preordering will












There existsan equilibrjun1 level ofarmaments Proof
Let A{M.Al2I,
(2I1(t) hm














Proof I(,) is linear in M(i), and Ai,4i), I=max{1;%,1j, so the proof involves
determining the sign of ?'11(t1)1'iM(0),i2 A1(t/?A11(0)2, (.J(0) for allt
Since, from (6) and Propositii;nI













From (22) it followsthat'1/M(0) so 0< M(()'M(0) <I, and. since2M1(t)/M.(0)2 is strictlypositive, this impliesthatwhere
Land 2arechosen such that g(M) exiSts and g(M)0. 1)efine
(50) g(M, M) -
g1(Jvf)
Because of Lemmas I and 2 g A -b A and therefore using the Brouwer Theorem a
fixed pointM1, M2 exists.
Proposition 5
The equilibrium point is stable if each country attempts to behave in a
myopically optimal manner.
Proof. Suppose M-> g(M3),q(M1, M) a solution to the optimization prob-
lem implies that q(ftf, M,)< q[g(M),Mi]. This in turn implies
C[p(M, Mi), M1. M] >Cp{g1(M),M],g1(M), M1}
and thus FJM,M) >0 if M1< g(M1).lfwe examine the resulting phase diagram
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